UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-19-2016

Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk
Clerk's Record Dckt. 44511

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk Clerk's Record Dckt. 44511" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6535.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6535

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, an Idaho
Corporation,

Supreme Court Case No. 44511

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of
Commerce,
Defendant-Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE SAMUEL A.HOAGLAND

CHRIST T. TROUPIS

CARL J. WITHROE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

EAGLE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

C·ASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-5467
I
§
Employers Resource Management Company
Location: Ada County District Court
vs.
Megan Ronk

§
§
§

Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel
Filed on: 03/23/2016

CASE INFOR!\IATI0'.11

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI)

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-OC-2016-5467
Ada County District Court
03/23/2016
Hoagland, Samuel

PARTY lNFORI\IATIO:',

Plaintiff

Employers Resource Management Company

Defendant

Ronk,Megan

DATE

EVENTS

& ORDERS OF THE COURT

03/23/2016

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

03/23/2016

Complaint Filed
Complaint Filed

03/23/2016

Summons Filed
Summons Filed

04/27/2016

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit OfService (417/16)

05/04/2016

Motion to Dismiss Case
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss

05/04/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Support ofDefendant's Motion to Dismiss

05/20/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss

05/24/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing

05/24/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 07/20/2016 03:00 PM)

05/26/2016

Motion
Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint

Lead Attorneys
Troupis, Christ Theodore
Retained
208-938-5584(W)

INDEX

000002
PAGE I OF3

Printed on 10/25/2016 at 8:33 AM

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-5467
05/26/2016

Declaration
Declaration OfChrist Troupis In Support OfMotion For Leave To Amend Complaint

05/26/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Support OfMotion For Leave To File Amended Complaint

07/15/2016

Reply
Reply Memorandum In Support OfDefendant's Motion To Dismiss

07/20/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 07/20/2016 03:00 PM· District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

07/20/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 08/02/2016 04:00 PM)

07/20/2016

Motion to Dismiss (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)

07/26/2016

Order Granted
Order Granting Leave to File Amended Complaint

07/26/2016

Amended
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief

07/28/2016

Notice
Notice of Change ofAddress

08/01/2016

Motion
Defendants Renewed Motion to Dismiss

08/02/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 08/02/2016 04:00 PM· District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

08/02/2016

Motion to Dismiss (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)

08/15/2016

Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack ofStanding

08/15/2016

Judgment

08/15/2016

Dismissed (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)

09/19/2016

Notice of Appeal

09/19/2016

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court

10/25/2016

Notice
a/Transcript Lodged-Supreme Court No.44511
FINANCIAL INFOR!\IATIO:'I

DATE

Other Party Unknown Payor
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

10.00
10.00

Balance Due as of 10/25/2016

0.00

Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company

000003
PAGE20F 3

Printed on I 0/25/2016 at 8: 33 AM

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-5467
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 10/25/2016

350.00
350.00

o.oo

000004
PAGE30F3

Printed on 10/25/2016 al 8:33 AM

l·

i

NO
A.M.

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE ,
801 E. State Street, Ste 50
POBox2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584
Facsimile:
208/ 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

\0"'30
•

FILED

P.M. _ _ __

MAR 23 2.016
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk
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.

Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV 0-C 1605 467 ~
Case No.:

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF

COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURCE OF AMERICA, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation, by and through_ its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cause of action
against Defendant, alleges as follows:
1.

This action arises under the provisions of Article II, §1, Article III, §1, and Article

VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides:

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged
with· the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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2. Article 3, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives."
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature.may allow such exemptions from taxation from
time to time as shall seem necessary and just..."
4.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be

exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board ofTax Appeals, 103
Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982)
5.

In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act,

("IRIA") which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the
· Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To qualify for the tax
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC")
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by the Governor. The EAC is
established under Idaho Code §67-4704.
6.

This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce,

by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article Ill, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers.
7.

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the

Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch ofldaho State Government,

-

-

and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void.
8.'

Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation,

("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28%
credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000.
9.

The State ofldaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an

unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure Plaintiffs'
employees away from Employers' Resource.
10.

Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce

and is named in that official capacity.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Declaratory Relief)

11.

Plaintiff re-alleges and· incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-

10, as though set forth herein in full.
12.

The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary

authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbids a delegation of unrestricted and
unguided taxing power.

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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13.

The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of

Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, §1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government.
14.

In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets

out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of
Idaho. That statute provides:
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number
of new jobs in the state ofldaho. In order to be considered for participation, an
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director
and shall include:
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that
will accrue to the state as a result of the project;
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council;
(c) Proof of a community match;
(d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission;
(e) A detailed statement with an estimate ofldaho goods and services to be
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term;
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state;
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress;
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to
issuance of the tax credit;
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment;
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of
suchjobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs;
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by
the project;
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63,
Idaho Code; and
·
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement.

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter
. into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the
. council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application."
15.

The only requirement that the legislature included in Idaho Code §67-4739 for a

business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to
the Director of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order to claim the
.

'

tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than twenty (20) such jobs over
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs
over the term of the project if created within an urban community."
16.

Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as

part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even
subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government.
17.

Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete

discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an
Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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.

.

entity will create the required number of 'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings,
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information
submitted.
18.

The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the

EAC with regard to the grant or denial of tax credits. The Director's sole duty is to determine
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited.
19.

Although provision has been made for judicial review of a rejected application by

the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case," and .
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to
the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial
remedy to an aggrieved applicant.
20.

The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority to grant a tax credit

to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines,
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business
entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism.
2 J.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and

through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating
Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution.
22.

Idaho taxpayers have and will suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of

Commerce, by and through the EAC, continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and
deny that relief to other entities, on an arbi!fary and discretionary basis, in violation of the Idaho
Constitution's grant of all taxing authority to the state Legislature.
23.

Plaintiff is entitled to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that the Idaho

Department of Commerce and the Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not
have authority under the Idaho Constitution t,o administer the provisions ofldaho Code §674739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by
the Department under the provisions of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho
Department of Commerce and the EAC under this statute are null and void.
24.

Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate

the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff and other Idaho taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to
recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein.

II
II
II
II
II
II
II

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
I. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce,
by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and
void.
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
Dated: March 23, 2016

By

Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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Christ T.Trupis
Attorney for Plaintiff

8

000012

,.

;:,

MAY O4 2016

LAWREN CE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri<
By ALESIA BUTTS
DEPUTY

STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
CARL J. WITHR0E, ISB #7051
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone:
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
Attorney for Defendant

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1605467
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS
Oral Argument Requested

-----------------)

Defendant, Idaho Department of Commerce Director Megan Ronk, moves the Court for
judgment of dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice, pursuant to Idaho
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum in support,
filed contemporaneously herewith.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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DATED this 4th day of May, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1throe
Deputy Attorney General

******************************************************
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
801 E. State Street, Suite 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

~~ail
O Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
D Electronic Mail: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

- ar J. Wit , e
Deputy Attorney General

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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A.M. _ _ _ _P.M.-~ui,---

MAY O4 2016

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ALESIA BUTTS
DEPUTY

STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
CARL J. WITHR0E, ISB #7051
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone:
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
Attorney for Defendant

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1605467
MEMORANDUMINSUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

-----------------)
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs case in its entirety, with prejudice, under Idaho R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We
explain below that Plaintiff lacks standing.
INTRODUCTION
Like many other states, Idaho established a system to incentivize the creation of privatesector jobs in Idaho.

See Idaho Code § 67-4737. This system, the Idaho Reimbursement

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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Incentive Act, makes refundable tax credits available to businesses in any industry with a
competitive project that adds a minimum number of new, full-time, nonseasonal jobs (depending
on whether the location is rural or urban) paying an average wage that equals or exceeds the
wage for the county where the business is located. See Idaho Code § 67-4738(11), (12). The
credit is available to both existing Idaho businesses and new Idaho businesses. A successful
applicant may receive a refundable tax credit for up to 15 years and up to 30% of the new
revenue Idaho receives from the company's corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and sales and
use tax attributable to a new project. The Idaho Department of Commerce administers the
program. Idaho Code§ 67-4740.
A business seeking the credit must apply. Idaho Code § 67-4739. Among the many
requirements an applicant must satisfy is that a business must demonstrate community support.

Id. at (l)(c). This means that the applicable local government unit must demonstrate "active
support of the applicant" including a contribution of money, fee waivers, in-kind services,
providing infrastructure, or a combination of these things. Idaho Code § 67-4738(5). A letter of
commitment by the local governing board must accompany the community match. Id.
As part of her review process, the Commerce director and her office conduct an in-depth
economic analysis of the project and its application material. This includes analysis of both the
benefits and potential detriments to the state or existing industries in the state. See Idaho Code §
67-4741(c) After the Commerce director reviews the application and if she determines that the
applicant has established eligibility for the credit, the director submits the application and her
recommended term and percentage of refund to the Economic Advisory Council for its review.
Idaho Code § 67-4739(2). The Council may approve or reject the project; and, it may ask for
additional information to aid its review. Id. If the Council approves the application and the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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director's recommended terms, the applicant business and the Commerce Department enter into
an agreement specifying the terms of the credit, including the duration of the credit, the
forecasted amount of new tax revenue the project will generate, and the percentage of tax
revenues that will be reimbursed to the project. Idaho Code§ 67-4740.
The tax credit under the Reimbursement Incentive Act is a performance-based credit.
Each year, every business that has entered into an agreement with the Commerce Department for
a tax credit must provide a detailed report demonstrating compliance with its agreement and the
other requirements. Idaho Code§ 67-4741. If on review, the Commerce Department determines
the applicant's information is inadequate to justify the tax credit, Commerce may seek further
information, or deny the credit.

Id at (2).

If the Commerce Department determines the

information provided by the applicant justifies a tax credit, the Commerce Department issues the
tax credit authorization and provides a copy of the authorization to the Idaho State Tax
Commission. Id at (3). The applicant then claims the credit on its tax return. The Commerce
Department must file a report annually with the Governor and Legislature detailing the
Commerce Department's success, with specific economic metrics. Idaho Code§ 67-4742.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant's motion is of the 12(b)(6) variety. So, the Court's task is to look solely to the
pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). When the motion is, Defendant's is, a motion to
dismiss for lack of standing, the Court will examine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the
requisite elements of standing in their complaint to survive Defendant's motion. Id.

II I
II I

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
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ARGUMENT
Plaintiff is a company in Idaho.

It has not applied for any tax credit under the

Reimbursement Incentive Act. Yet, it challenges the validity of the Reimbursement Incentive
Act, not because the Act has caused it any harm, but that "Idaho taxpayers will suffer irreparable
harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the [Economic Advisory Council]
continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny that relief to other entities ...."
Complaint, p. 7. Indeed, the closest Plaintiff comes to alleging concrete harm specific to it is its
allegation that a competitor received a credit. Complaint, p. 3. These allegations are insufficient
to establish that Plaintiff has standing to sue. This Court should therefore dismiss the Complaint
in its entirety, with prejudice.
Standing is a fairly basic principle of jurisdiction. To show standing, and thus to survive
a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles v.
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). The plaintiffs injury must be

"peculiar or personal that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public."
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). There is

more to the injury requirement than "the defendant harmed me"; standing necessitates a
"showing of 'distinct palpable injury' and 'fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho at 104, 44
P.3d at 1159.

And the alleged injury must be real-that is, "standing can never be based on a

merely hypothetical injury." State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195
(2015). The standing inquiry, then, focuses on the party seeking relief, not on the issues the
party wants decided. Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.3d at 761.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 4
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Plaintiffs complaint comes nowhere close to satisfying these requirements. It alleges
injury on behalf of taxpayers, not the company itself. Complaint, p. 8. Plaintiff does nothing to
distinguish harm it says will fall on taxpayers from harm that will fall specifically to it. General
taxpayer standing-meaning a complaint that all taxpayers will suffer injury from government
conduct-does riot exist because in that instance the conduct affects all taxpayers the same. See
Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000);
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035 (no standing where plaintiff failed

to show peculiar or personal injury that is different from that suffered by any other member of

,.
the public); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724
(1993) (no taxpayer standing to challenge insufficient school funding because they did not suffer
distinct, palpable injury different than anyone else); Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club,
Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 342 P.2d 719 (1959) (no standing to challenge disannexing ordinance even

though they could suffer increased property taxes; increased taxes would be common to all
taxpayers of the city). This is so even if the taxpayer alleges some indirect harm. Koch v.
Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008). By definition, an allegation that Idaho

taxpayers will suffer is an allegation that plaintiffs injury is just the same as its fellow
taxpayers'-and hence, not distinct and peculiar to them. They cannot maintain their suit on this
basis of harm.
Neither can Plaintiff maintain its suit over a standing defense on the basis that an alleged
competitor received a credit. Assuming their argument is that their competitor will be aided by
the credit, they have failed to allege any harm from that alleged aid to a competitor; but more
importantly, the Supreme Court has firmly rejected a claim that added competition in the
marketplace is the sort of harm that can confirm standing. In Martin v. Camas County, 150

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
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Idaho 508, 248 P.3d l243 (2011), a plaintiff sought to challenge a county zoning decision that,
the plaintiff said, increased the availability of lots zoned like his. The theory was that with a
higher supply of like lots, the value of the plaintiffs lots would drop. The plaintiffs claim that
the increased number of lots would harm in the form of increased competition was dismissed:
His purported injuries were "thoroughly speculative and cannot be said to be specific or distinct
and palpable"; the Court said that it has "never held that increased competition alone is sufficient
to confer standing." 150 Idaho at 514,248 P.3d at 1249.
In the one reported Idaho case where a taxpayer had standing as a taxpayer, the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding was narrow, and plaintiffs case is nothing like it. In Ameritel Inns,
Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005), the Court

allowed a taxpayer in an auditorium district to challenge the district's expenditure of public
money to advocate for voter approval of proposed bonds. Id. at 851, 119 P .3d at 626. That
public advocacy for a particular position, the hotel argued, violated state law. But Ameritel Inns
is nothing like this case because the auditorium had extracted a tax from the hotel and then was
allegedly using that money to advocate in favor of the bond-something that was illegal. And, if
the auditorium's advocacy efforts were successful and the bond passed, the hotel would have
endured an imminent and certain increase in taxes since the obligation for the bond fell on the
owners within the auditorium district. But here, the challenge is not to the extraction from
Plaintiff and subsequent use of that money in violation of state law; rather, the system Plaintiff
challenges is a tax credit to someone else. There is a difference between the two. See Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (no taxpayer standing to challenge

tax credit system that matched contributions to organizations that provided scholarships to
private schools). Tax credits are not the same thing as expenditures because simply reducing
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one's tax liability is not a sum paid out by the government. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d
656, 660 (Mo. 2011). And so there is no taxpayer standing in this case to challenge a tax credit.

See DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
Plaintiffs case is unlike Ameritel Inns in another important way. In that case there was
an allegation of imminent and certain tax increases directly resulting from the allegedly unlawful
expenditure, here, there is no allegation of increased taxes or any other harm to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff simply alleges just that a competitor received a tax credit. It does not even specifically
allege increased competition; it simply leaves this to inference. Even so, a speculative claim of
increased competition is legally insufficient to establish standing. See Martin v. Camas County,
150 Idaho at 514, 248 P.3d at 1249. Lest Plaintiff contend that tax credits should be treated like
expenditures of tax revenues, and that they are somehow injured by the depletion of the state
treasury by these credits, there is no authority to aid that position. Those sorts of injuries are
"conjectural and hypothetical" because tax credits do not necessarily deplete the treasury.

DiamlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 344. Indeed, programs like the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive
Act are designed specifically to "spur economic activity, which in turn increases government
revenues." Id. Plaintiff has simply failed to allege any cognizable harm that would justify its
suit moving forward. Plaintiff has no standing to challenge the Reimbursement Incentive Act.
CONCLUSION

This Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, under
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II I
II I

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 7

000021

.,. ,.~ '

,,.
'

.

.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO

******************************************************
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
801 E. State Street, Suite 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

~
O

Hand Delivery

D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
D Electronic Mail: ctroupis@tro

Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
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801 E. State Street, Ste 50
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Telephone: 208/ 938-5584
Facsimile:
208/ 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By ALESIA BUTTS
DEPUTY

Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 1605467

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company submits the following
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, 12(b)(6).

I
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE HAS STANDING
TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STATE'S SUBSIDIZATION
OF ITS BUSINESS COMPETITOR

A.

Employers Resource has 'competitor standing' based on the 'distinct palpable
injury' to its business as a direct result of the State's action in subsidizing its
competitor's business by granting it a $6.5 million tax credit.
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Employers Resource initiated this lawsuit because the Idaho Department of Commerce
exercised its discretionary authority under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act to grant a
subsidy in the form of a tax credit to Paylocity, a direct competitor of Employers Resource. The
Complaint alleges that injury to Employers Resource. The Complaint also alleges that all Idaho
taxpayers have been and will be injured by similar unconstitutional actions of the Department of
Commerce in granting tax subsidies to Paylocity and other companies of its choice under the
auspices of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act. The Defendant's motion to dismiss is based
entirely on the assertion that the Complaint alleges only a claim of 'taxpayer standing.' That is
inaccurate because the Complaint also alleges a direct economic injury to Employers Resource.
Employers Resource' standing is predicated on the unique, 'distinct palpable injury' that
Employers Resource has and will suffer by reason of the actions of the Department of Commerce
in granting a tax credit to its direct competitor, Paylocity._ That injury to Employers Resource is
not a 'generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens.' It is an imminent injury
unique to Employers Resource. Its right to bring this lawsuit arises under the doctrine of
'Competitor Standing,' not 'Taxpayer Standing.'
The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges competitor standing in the form of a distinct palpable
injury to Employers Resource that is a direct result of the tax credit subsidy granted to Paylocity
by the Department of Commerce. Paragraphs 8 and 9 state:
"8.
Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho
Corporation, ("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies.
Recently, the EAC granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers'
Resource competitors, a 28% credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its
promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the
EAC is approximately $6,500,000.
9.
The State ofldaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it
an unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure
Plaintiffs' employees away from Employers' Resource."
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Admittedly, the harms suffered by Employers Resource as a result of the State's actions
could have been alleged in greater detail. However, the Plaintiff contends that the allegations in
the Complaint are sufficient to satisfy the doctrine of competitor standing. In the event that the
Court concludes that the allegations of harm to Employers Resource are insufficient, Plaintiff
requests leave of court to file an amended Complaint setting out those allegations in detail.

B.

The applicable legal standard.
The facts alleged show that Employers Resource meets the jurisdictional requirements for

standing in this case. Since the Defendant's motion is for judgment on the pleadings rather than
summary judgment, the Court reviews the pleadings to determine whether standing exists. In

Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 103, 44 P.3d 1157 (Idaho 2002), the Court set out the
applicable standard.
"When we review an order dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the
non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor.
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,961,895 P.2d 561,562 (1995) (citing Miles
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989)). After drawing
all inferences in the non-moving party's favor, we then ask whether a claim for relief has
been stated. Id. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether
the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes
to have adjudicated. Van Valkenburgh at 124, 15 P.3d at 1132; Boundary Backpackers v.
Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371,375,913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996)(quotingMiles at
639, 778 P.2d at 761). To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a
litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. (citations omitted). This requires
a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (internal
quotations omitted). But even if a showing can be made of an injury in fact, standing may
be denied when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class
of citizens. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
(1975)); Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (stating "a citizen and taxpayer may not
challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered by all citizens and
taxpayers alike."); Bopp v. City ofSandpoin(, 110 Idaho 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986);
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Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (1959). Id, at
104-105.

C.

Employers Resource has standing based on a competitive injury resulting from
the Department of Commerce's action that changed market conditions.
The United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of competitor standing to the

claims of an Idaho company harmed by federal executive action on tax policy that benefitted its
competitors. In Clinton v. City o/New York, 524 U.S. 417, 426-427, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., an Idaho cooperative, ("Snake
River") had "competitor standing" to challenge the President's cancellation of a tax benefit that
put Snake River at a disadvantage with its competitors. The Supreme Court discussed the
application of the doctrine to Snake River as follows:
"Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was formed in May
1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing their crops and stabilizing prices, in
part through a strategy of acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the
members of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-party
processors. At that time, Congress was considering the amendment to the capital gains
tax that was expressly intended to aid farmers' cooperatives in the purchase of processing
facilities, and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the amendment if
passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on behalf of Snake River, was engaged in
negotiations with the owner of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for
the tax benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations terminated when the
President canceled § 968. Snake River is currently considering the possible purchase of
other processing facilities in Idaho if the President's cancellation is reversed. Based on
these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River plaintiffs were injured by
the President's cancellation of §968, as they "lost the benefit of being on equal footing
with their competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities
now that the sellers will not [be] able to take advantage of section 968's tax breaks." Id.,
at 177. 1
The Court pointed out that Snake River had competitor standing because it had a
"personal stake" in having an actual injury redressed rather than an abstract and widely dispersed

1

Court's citation is to City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F.Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998)
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institutional injury, and its injury arose directly from the President's action in cancelling the tax
benefit. The Court noted:
"The Snake River farmers' cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the
President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the
acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the
importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted§ 968 for the specific purpose of
providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of
assets. The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory
"bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their
purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected §968 as one of only two tax
benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation
· rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a
significant impact on the federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was
organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to
utilize the benefits of § 968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner
of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale
when the President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other
processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President's cancellation is
reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be
able to purchase. By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our
precedents. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,620 (1971);
3K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court
routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions]
that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III 'injury-in-fact'
requirement] ....It follows logically that any ... petitioner who is likely to suffer
economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions
satisfies this part of the standing test'')." (emphasis added) Id. at 432-433.
In United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 295 F.3d
1326, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the Court held that U.S. Telecom Association ("USTA") members
had standing to challenge an FCC order finding that its competitor, the Iowa Communications
Network, was a common carrier and therefore eligible for federal subsidies to provide discounted
telecommunication services in competition with USTA. The Court stated:
" USTA contends that the FCC's order injures its members by making ICN eligible for a
subsidy that permits it to offer lower prices for the same telecommunications services.
We have repeatedly recognized that parties "suffer constitutional injury in fact when
agencies ... allow increased competition" against them. Louisiana Energy & Power
Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364,367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n
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v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir.2001); MD Pharm., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And we have likewise recognized that
regulatory decisions that permit subsidization of some participants in a market can have
the requisite injurious impact on those participants' competitors. See Exxon Co., US.A, v.
FERC, 182 F.3d 30, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701."
The doctrine of competitor standing has been applied to various forms of economic
injury. Thus, the Court in Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) noted that,
"The doctrine of competitor standing addresses the first requirement by recognizing that
economic actors " suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on
their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition" against them. La. Energy &
Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C.Cir.1998); accord New World Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C.Cir.2002) (" basic law of economics" that increased
competition leads to actual injury); see also Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United
States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008) (doctrine of competitor standing" relies on
economic logic to conclude that a plaintiff will likely suffer an injury-in-fact when the
government acts in a way that increases competition or aids the plaintiffs competitors" ).
The form of that injury may vary; for example, a seller facing increased competition
may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price or to expend more resources to
achieve the same sales, all to the detriment of its bottom line. Because increased
competition almost surely injures a seller in one form or another, he need not wait
until "allegedly illegal transactions ... hurt {him] competitively" before challenging the
regulatory (or,for that matter: the deregulatory) governmental decision that increases
competition. La. Energy, 141 F.3d at 367." (emphasis added)
B~cause the US Telecom case was decided by summary judgment motion rather than ·
judgment on the pleadings, USTA had submitted member affidavits showing that it was ready,
willing and able to compete with ICN. The Court remarked that these affidavits were sufficient
to satisfy the remaining two requirements of constitutional standing, noting:
"... [T]he competitive injury suffered by USTA's members is fairly traceable to the FCC's
decision to render ICN eligible for the subsidy, and that injury would likely be
redressed by a favorable decision of this court vacating the FCC's order. See High Plains
Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599,605 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Exxon, 182 F.3d at 43;
Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701. We therefore conclude that USTA has constitutional
standing to seek judicial review of the order on behalf of its members."
The Complaint in this case alleges that Employers Resource has and will suffer an
imminent injury that is fairly traceable to the Department of Commerce's grant of a tax credit to
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Employers' competitor, Paylocity, subsidizing its business and providing it with a competitive
advantage over Employers Resource. The suit seeks declaratory relief in the form of a judgment
declaring that the grant of tax credits to Paylocity and other companies by the Department of
Commerce under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act violates the provisions of the Idaho
Constitution. That relief will fully redress Employers' injury.
The Defendant cited Martin v. Camas County ex.rel. Bd. Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 248
P.3d 1243 (2011) for the proposition that "increased competition alone is insufficient to confer
standing." Martin involved a landowner's complaint about a zoning ordinance. In ruling that
Martin did not have standing, the Court noted that "Martin cites to no authority in support of his
argument that a comprehensive county-wide change in zoning designations (wherein some
parcels ofland receive a higher zoning density classification than they previously enjoyed)
constitutes an injury to a property owner, absent some resultant specific and traceable harm.
(emphasis added) Martin argues that the upzoning of approximately 20,000 acres of property in
:Camas County wili'decrease the value of his property for development, because of the increase
in supply.")
The proposition cited from Martin has no relevance to our case. Employers Resource has
not complained that the State of Idaho is encouraging competition. Employers Resource
welcomes fair competition. Its complaint is that the State of Idaho is partnering with Employers
Resource's competitor, subsidizing its business by unconstitutional means and at taxpayer
expense, which puts Employers' Resource business at an unfair competitive economic
disadvantage. While Martin had only a generalized grievance based on speculation, Employers
Resource has alleged a specific traceable harm to it resulting from the action of the State in
subsidizing its competitor.
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When the Idaho Supreme Court considered the standing of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe to
petition for a Writ of Mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 as
law after the Governor failed to return his veto within the five-day deadline under the Idaho
Constitution, the Court pointed out that the presence of a "distinct and palpable injury" would
have distinguished the Tribe's claim based on competitive disadvantage from the Martin
decision.2 The State had argued that the Tribe had not shown how the law repealing 'historical'
horse race wagering impacted the Tribe's gaming activities. The Court opined:
"The Tribe claims that it is particularly harmed due to its distinct rights under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). See 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. Although the
Tribe has established a unique and protected right towards gaming in the state, it fails to
present sufficient facts as to how S.B. 1011 impacts the Tribe's ability to benefit from
gaming going forward. The Tribe correctly concedes that this Court "has never held that
increased competition alone is sufficient to confer standing." Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex
rel. Bd. Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508,514,248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011). Without
providing facts to show actual or imminent losses of profit or rights greater than the
average citizen, the Tribe has not demonstrated a "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient
to confer standing. Troutner, 142 Idaho at 391, 128 P.3d at 928."
The Complaint in this case alleges facts that show that Employers Resource has and will
be economically injured by the action of the Department of Commerce in granting its competitor
a tax credit to subsidize its business in Idaho. Paylocity has agreed to locate its business in Boise
based on the Department's agreement to give it a $6.5 million tax credit. Employers Resource
cannot compete on the same level with a company in partnership with the State. Its economic
injury is certain to occur, imminent, and unique to Employers Resource. Its damages are and will
not be shared by the average citizen or suffered on a generalized basis. On these facts, Employers
Resource has standing to pursue its claim for declaratory relief against the Idaho Department of
Commerce.
2

IN THE MATTER OF THE VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, Petitioner, v. LAWERENCE DENNEY, Secretary of State of the
State ofldaho, in his official capacity, Respondent. No. 43169 Supreme Court ofldaho
November 20, 2015, 2015 Opinion No. 106
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The Defendant's Motion should therefore be denied.
Respectfully Submitted,

·stT. Troupis
Attorney for Plaintiff
Employers Resource Management Company,
an Idaho Corporation

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by U.S. Mail,
fust class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Steven L. 0 lsen
Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
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STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY
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Case No.: CV OC 1605467
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho
Corporation; by and through its counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis of Troupis Law
Office, P.A., and hereby move this Court pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an order granting leave to amend the complaint in this matter to include
additional allegations of the damages that the Plaintiff has and will incur by reason of the
actions of the Defendant as presently alleged in the Complaint. A true and accurate copy
of the Amended Complaint is attached to the Declaration of Christ Troupis as Exhibit
"A."
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This motion is made on the grounds that the requested amendment is necessary to

set out the allegations of damages in sufficient detail to provide adequate notice to the
Defendant of the claims of the Plaintiff in this action.
This motion is further based upon the records and files herein, the Declaration of
Christ T. Troupis and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint filed
concurrently herewith.
Oral argument is requested on this motion.
DATED This .J!f_ day of May, 2016.
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A.,

By:
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Deputy Attorney General .
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P.O. Box 83720
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Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEGAN. RONK, in her capacity· as
Director of the IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ·
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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)

Case No.: CV OC 1605467

DECLARATION OF CHRIST
TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

I, Ghrist T. Troupis, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(d) and LC.§ 9-1406, declare as follows:
1.

I am the a~omey of record for the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter, I am over

the age of 18, I have personal knowledge to the facts stated herein, and I am competent to testify
to the same.
2.

Attached hereto is Plaintiffs proposed First Amended Complaint.

3.

It is necessary for the Plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint in order to describe

in greater detail the nature and elements of the damages claimed by the Plaintiff to have resulted
from the Defendant's actions.
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4.

The lawsuit is at its earliest stage and no prejudice can result to the Defendant

from permitting this Amendment, since no discovery has been propounded and no trial date has
been scheduled.
5.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho that

the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this .l:!f._ day of May, 2016.

Christ T. Troupis

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2!fday of May, 2016, a true and correct copy.of the
. foregoing document was served as follows:
Steven L. Olsen
Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100

~

First Class Mail
[ ] .Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712
9vernight Delivery

[J
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
801 E. State Street, Ste 50
POBox2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584
Facsimile:
208/ 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as_
Director of the IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 1605467
FIRST AMENDED COlVIPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF

COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURC_E OF AMERICA, INC.,
an Idaho <;orporation, by and through its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cau~e of action
against Defendant, alleges as follows:
1.

This action arises under the provisions of Article II, §1, Article III, §1, and Article

VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides:

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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2. Article 3, §1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives."
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from
time to time as shall seem necessary and just.. .11
4.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be

exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board o/Tax Appeals, 103
Idaho 808, 654 P.2d 901 (1982)
5.

In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act,

(".I~") which was then.amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits !O be issued by the
Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To qualify for the tax
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC")
The EAC is
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by .the Governor.
.
established under Idaho Code §67-4704.
6.

This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce,

by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested
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(

solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers.
7.

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the

Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch of Idaho State Government,
and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void.
8.

Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation,

("Employers Resource") is one ofldaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28%
credit against its future tax liabilities in return fo~ its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000.
9.

The St~te c;,f Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an

unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, mcluding the ability to lure Plaintiffs'
employees away from Employers' Resource.
10.

Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result

of the actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the
following:
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation.of the web requirements to
effectivelyy compete against Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred additional
expenses for internet competitive software;
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the number of
employees it hires, Employers Resource expects that its key employees will be targeted by
Paylocity because of their training, experience, and familiarity with Employers' existing Idaho
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customer base. Employers' will incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to retain its
key employees;
c) Employers' anticipate the need to protect its existing Idaho business since
Paylocity can afford to undercut Employers' pricing, in part due to its favorable tax treatment.
Employers will incur expenses in advertising and marketing expenses to retain its clients;
11.

The discretionary administration of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Program as

applied to Employers' Resource's business damages Employers Resource and other Idaho
businesses in the following ways:
a) By rewarding the cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants
into the Idaho business market; .
b) By distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by
chosen companies to the detriment of exist~g Idaho businesses, including Employers.
c) By incentivizing Employers Resource and other existing Idaho businesses to
relocate their principal offices to other states offering similar tax incentives to out of state
businesses;
d) By penalizing Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets;
e) By pitting Counties and Municipalities against each other to compete for new
business by offering discretionary and arbitrary tax breaks.
12.

Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce

and is named in that official capacity.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Declaratory Relief)

13.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-

12, as though set forth herein in full.
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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14.

The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary

authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbids a delegation of unrestricted and
· unguided taxing power.
15.

The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of

Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, §1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government.
16.

In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets

out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of
Idaho. That sta~te provides:
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number
of new jobs in the state of Idaho. In order to be·considered for participation, an
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director
and shall include:
·
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that
will accrue to the·state as a result of the project;
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council;
(c) Proof of a community match;
(d) A letter from the- tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good
standing in the state ofldaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of
any state tax or fee administer~d by the tax commission;
(e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term;
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state;
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress;
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to
issuance of the tax credit;
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment;
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of
such jobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs;·
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by
the project;
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief
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required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63,
Idaho Code; and
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement.
(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter
into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the
council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application."
17.

The only requiremen~ that the legislature included in.Idaho. Code §67-473 9 for a

business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to
the Direct<:>r of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order ~o ~laim the
tax credit, an entity must create a

minimum number of new jobs in the state ofldaho. "Minimum

new jobs,, is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than :twenty (20) such jobs over
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs
over the term of the project if created within an urban community."
18.

Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as

part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even
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subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch ofldaho State Government.
19.

Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete

discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an
entity will create the required number of 'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings,
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information
submitted.
20.

The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the

EAC with regard to _the grant or denial of tax credits. The_ Director's sole duty is to determine
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited.

21.

. Although provision has been made for judicial rev1ew of a rejected application by

the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a II contested cas_e, 11 and
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to
the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial
remedy to an ~ggrieved applicant.
22.

The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority.to grant a tax credit

to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines,
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business
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entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism.
23.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and

through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and
capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating
Article II, § 1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution.
24.

Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and taxpayers have and will

suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the EAC,
co~tinues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny that relief to other entities, on an
arbitrary and discretionary basis, in violation of the Idaho Constitution's grant of all taxing
authority to the state Legislature.

24. ·

Plaintiff is entitled .to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that tlie ·Idaho

Department of Comnierce· and the_ Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not
have authority under the Idaho Constitution to administer the provisions of Idaho Code §674739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by
the Department under the provisio11s of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho
Department of Comme_rce and the EAC under this statute are null and void.
25.

Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate

the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and
taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred
herein.

II
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-WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce,
by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and
void.
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
Dated: May 24, 2016

By~~~~-----Christ T. Troupis
Attorney for Plaintiff
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By ALESIA BUTTS
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Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the IDAHO.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.
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Case No.: CV OC 1605467
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

CONIES NOW Plaintiff, Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho
Corporation, by and through its counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis of Troupis Law
Office, P.A., and hereby submit the foregoing memorandum in support of its motion to
amend complaint.
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is seeking to amend its Complaint in this matter to set out in greater
detail the allegations of damages incurred by reason of Defendant's actions. Rule 15(a) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave of the court to amend a pleading
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"shall be freely given when justice so requires" (emphasis added); Clark v. Olsen, 110

Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1996); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d
348 (1960); Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129,134,326 P.2d 994 (1958).

In Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 461 P.2d 129, 1305-06
(1977), the Idaho Supreme Court expressly placed the burden of showing why a court
should not grant leave to amend a complaint on the parties opposed to the amendment.
Id. As Smith declares, the refusal to grant leave to amend without justifying reason is,
per se, an abuse of discretion. Id.

In the case at bar, Plaintiff has alleged that the actions of the State Department of
Commerce in subsidizing. the business of Paylocity, a competito! of Plaintiff, by
providing it with an Idaho tax incentive, has and will damage Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to
set out the nature and descriptio~ of its d~ages in greater detail in order to provide
notice to the Defendant of its claims.
Defendant will not .be prejudiced by the filing of an Amended Complaint because
the parties have ample time to respond to the amended pleading. The case is at its earliest
stage and no discovery has been conducted. Following long-standing precedent,
Defendants have the burde.n of showing prejudice of any kind. Absent a showing of
prejudice, this Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Amend.
DATED This _.J!/__ day of May, 2016.
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A.,
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served as follows:
Steven L. Olsen
Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100

~ First Class Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712
[ ] Overnight Delivery

(lpiA)

12Y:

Christ T. Troupis
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ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

_________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1605467
REPLYMEMORANDUMIN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional an important statutory program that incentivizes
economic growth in Idaho by allowing tax credits to businesses that meet various criteria relating
to job creation or expansion. Plaintiff is not the object of the government action at issue. In
response to Director Ronk's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, Plaintiff contends not that the
program's treatment of it deprives it of a legally recognized interest, but rather, that the
program's treatment of another entity causes injury to its competitive position in the
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marketplace. The company tries to show injury by alleging that it anticipates it may make
certain business decisions as a result of what it thinks that other entity may do.
Plaintiff's argument presumes a legally protected interest in its competitive position in
the marketplace, which it does not have. Additionally, the speculative harm, self-inflicted and
too attenuated and contingent to meet the standing burden, infects Plaintiff's case with a number
of defects that require it be dismissed.

l.

Plaintiff's original complaint raised a generalized grievance about the program,

claiming that taxpayers would be harmed. Compl. p. 7. It also alleged that the grant of a tax
credit to a c~mpetitor gave the competitor an "unfair economic advantage." Id at 3. The
complaint that taxpayers would be injured must be dispatched because there is no taxpayer
standing in Idaho. Memo. in Support of Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 5; see also Idaho Sch. for Equal
Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993). And the competitor

argument does not satisfy standing requirements either, because the Idaho Supreme Court has
"never held that increased competition alone is sufficient to confer standing." Memo. in Support
of Def.'s Mot. Dismiss pp. 5-6; Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011).
Plaintiff failed to allege facts that showed anything other than a competitor received a tax credit
under the Reimbursement Incentive Act. Its claim of harm was pure guess. With nothing more
than a bare claim of generalized increased competition, the Complaint failed to satisfy the
requirements for standing: injury in fact, a sufficient causal connection between the injury and
the conduct at issue, and a substantial likelihood that injunctive relief will redress the claimed
injury. See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806,807,241 P.3d 979, 980 (2010).
2.

But no, Plaintiff says, it does have standing, under the "competitor standing"
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doctrine. Memo. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 2. 1 Plaintiff's argument goes as follows: A
competitor received a tax credit under the program at issue, the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive
Act. Plaintiff says that the competitor is an internet-based company, and so Plaintiff had to buy
"competitive software" to keep up.

First Am. Compl. Deel. Relief p. 3.

And, since the

competitor's tax credit is determined in part based on the number of employees it hires, Plaintiff
"expects" that the competitor will seek to lure its "key employees" away.

Id.

Plaintiff

"anticipate[s] the need to protect its existing Idaho business since [the competitor] can afford to
undercut [Plaintiff's] pricing .... " Id. at 4. So, it says, it "will incur expenses in advertising and
marketing expenses to retain its clients." Id.
More generally, Plaintiff complains that the program "reward[s] the cannibalization of
existing Idaho businesses," "distort[s] the Idaho labor market" by "incentivizing [Plaintiff] and
other existing Idaho businesses to relocate their principal offices" to states with similar tax
incentives, "penalize[es] Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets," and
"pit[s] Counties and Municipalities against each other .... " Id.
Based on the tax credit to Plaintiff's competitor, Plaintiff alleges that it just can't
compete. Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Dismiss p. 8. These allegations, Plaintiff says, establish
that it will suffer certain and imminent harm to its competitive interests in the market and that the
harm it will suffer is unique to it. Id.
3.

Plaintiff argues that these al~egations permit it to sue Director Ronk under the

"competitor standing" rule. The company does not describe this rule, but offers three federal
cases (and no Idaho cases) as examples of how it applies. Assuming the doctrine applies in

1

Plaintiff recognized that its factual allegations could have been presented in greater detail, and
seeks to amend its complaint to add some detail it thinks will pass standing muster. Whichever
complaint the Court considers, the result should be the same.
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Idaho (but see Martin, 150 Idaho 514, 248 P.3d at 1249), it does not apply the way Plaintiff
thinks it does, and it does not apply in this case.
4.

Competitor standing falls under the injury-in-fact prong. Its habitat is largely the

D. C. Circuit, which is the primary enclave for litigation challenging things the federal
government does.

See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different?

A

Historical View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375, 376-77 (2006). And lots of these challenges involve highly

regulated industries regulated by an alphabet soup of agencies-the EPA, FERC, the NLRB, the
FAA, and the FCC, to name a few-under highly complex and detailed rules. These agencies
may set rates, establish criteria for participation in a market, or otherwise manage the small
details of participating in a particular industry. Spawning from challenges to federal agency
conduct by competitors alleging that the agency that controls so much of the market, the D.C.
Circuit postulates that companies have a protectable interest in their position in the marketplace
and that "economic actors 'suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies lift restrictions on their
competitors or o.therwise allow increased competition' against them." Shirley v. Sebelius, 610
F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367
(D.C. Cir. 1998)). The theory is that a business's protectable position in the marketplace is
assumed to be injured when government action that increases competition is certain and
imminent.
But, a party's obligation to show injury-in-fact is not absolved simply by applying the
coµipetitor standing label to its claim. The increase in competition must be "imminent." See
Shirley, 610 F.3d at 73-74 (increase in competition was "imminent"; La. Energy & Power Auth.,

141 F.3d at 367 (same). The D.C. Circuit has declined, for example, to find competitor standing
where there was only "some vague probability" of increased competition and "a still lower
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probability" of injury from that competition. DEK Energy Co. v. FERC, 248 F.3d 1192, 1196
(D.C. Cir. 2001). And the concreteness requirement remains. The less imminent the injury is,
the more difficult time a plaintiff has showing concreteness. As a general standing principle, the
U.S. Supreme Court has "repeatedly reiterated that 'threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact,' and that '[a]llegations of possible future injury are not

sufficient." Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting 'Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).

5.

Challenges by plaintiffs who are not the object of the government regulation-

like in this case-face other difficulties. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that "when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is
not precluded but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). This is because, in such a case, "[t]he existence of one or

more of the essential elements of standing 'depends on the unfettered choices made by
independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion
the courts cannot presume to either control or predict .... " Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (Op. of Kennedy, J.)). So, for example, the D.C. Circuit has denied
standing where "the plaintiff seeks to change the defendant's behavior only as a means to alter
the conduct of a third party, not before the court, who is the direct source of the plaintiffs
injury." Common Cause v. Dep'tofEnergy, 702 F.2d 245,251 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs challenging the tax treatment of competitors have no easier go at demonstrating
standing. The problem is in showing both imminence and concreteness; it lies in the nature of
challenges to government treatment of someone else, and the contingent and speculative nature
of the harm flowing from that treatment. An example of this is American Society of Travel
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Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There, for-profit private travel agents
earned their living primarily on commissions gained from selling transportation and travelrelated services in the States and abroad. Id at 148. The plaintiff travel agents in the case
challenged the tax-exempt status of income from tax-exempt 501(c)(3) companies selling
transportation and travel-related services-in direct competition with the travel agents. Id Just
like Plaintiff in this case, the travel agents complained that their injury arose from the Internal
Revenue Service's "creation of an unfair competitive atmosphere ...." Id. at 149. But that was
not good enough to demonstrate standing. It was "too speculative." Id
And in Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C. Circuit denied standing
to a political candidate excluded from debates hosted by a non-profit organization who sought to
challenge the organization's tax treatment. The plaintiff rooted her challenge in competitor
standing, but the court found her claim of injury too contingent to satisfy standing requirements.
The court noted that the plaintiff "challenging the actions of the IRS only as a means of affecting
the behavior of the [tax exempt debate-hosting organization]." The IRS actions "caused her
alleged injury only due to other intervening causal factors, including the FEC's regulations, the
[debate-hosting organization's] actions, and the anticipated behavior of other debate
participants." Id. 1330-31. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of AfricanAmerican children could not challenge IRS regulations governing tax-exempt status of private
schools; claimed injury that exempt schools could draw white students, thus perpetuating racial
segregation, was "entirely speculative").
6.

And so to Plaintiffs claim of harm. It does not fit into the three cases it cited.

Take first Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The potato growers there would
have lost a tax credit if the President's line-item veto effectively eliminating the credit had stood.
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Plaintiff suggests that the potato growers had competitor standing "to challenge the President's
cancellation of a tax benefit that put [the potato growers] at a disadvantage with its competitors."
Memo. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 4. But what Plaintiff misses is that the statute gave
the growers something that the line-item veto would have taken away. Standing there is fairly
straightforward; the plaintiff was the object of the challenged governmental conduct.

Indeed,

the tax credit was a "bargaining chip" for parties like the potato growers to use in acquiring
assets; "[b]y depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation [of the tax credit]
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents."
Id. at 432. But the Plaintiff here is not the object of the governmental action.
Shirley v. Sebelius is of no help to Plaintiff either. There, the National Institutes of

Health issued guidelines pursuant to presidential order that expanded the scope of stem-cell
research projects that could be funded by the National Institutes of Health. 610 F.3d at 70-71. A
group of physicians challenged that order as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Thus, the NIH guidelines permitted new entrants into a market for fixed resources; plaintiff
physicians would face imminent increased competition for access to this limited, fixed amount of
NIH funding. This intensified competition, though, was a certainty. Id. at 74. Importantly, the
government in Shirley lifted regulatory restrictions that drew more competitors into a market
with limited funds to disperse. Here, of course, the Reimbursement Incentive Act merely makes
money available to a business that meets the standards set out in the statute. And Plaintiff fails
to allege any facts relating to actual competition. Again, its only allegations are that it may have
to do certain things to compete. But Plaintiff fails to even allege what the market is, its share,
and how, precisely, the tax credit-rather than all the other market factors-would injure
Plaintiffs competitive position in the market. It is therefore far from a certainty-indeed, it is
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purely speculative-whether Plaintiff will be injured and how the grant of a tax credit to one
competitor will harm it.
Plaintiff's case is also unlike U.S. Telecom Association v. Federal Communications
Commission, 295 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2002). There, telecom providers challenged the FCC's

order that another telecom provider was a common carrier under the Telecommunications Act
and therefore eligible for a subsidy for which the petitioners were not. The common carrier
classification and its attendant subsidy allowed the competitor to sell telecom services at a lower
cost than the petitioners. Id. at 1331. It was in the context of this differential treatment of two
classes of providers-one eligible for a subsidy, one not-that the D.C. Circuit found injury to
competitive interests sufficient to establish standing. Here, of course, Plaintiff is eligible to
apply for the tax credit if it does the things the statute requires. It has simply chosen not to.
The D.C. Circuit's finding of standing in U.S. Telecom Association was aided by
affidavits submitted by the petitioners showing that they had lost out on contracts and that the
subsidy flowing from the common carrier classification left them "unable to compete for new
customers .... " Id. 2 Plaintiff has not alleged anything other than speculative guesses at what it
may have to do to maintain a competitive position in the marketplace. It has not alleged loss of

sales, contracts, clients, or an inability to secure new contracts.
Plaintiff disputes Martin's relevance to this case, but it is relevant because Plaintiff's
claim of harm is increased competition, just like the developer's was in Martin. The court in
Martin did not credit the developer's argument that the additional supply of like-zoned lots

2

The affidavits were submitted after oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, id. at 1330, not on
summary judgment, as Plaintiff suggests. See Mem. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss p. 6.
The case was a petition for review of the FCC order, which means there was no district court and
no motion for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (courts of appeals have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine validity of final orders of the FCC).
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caused him harm even though the developer claimed he would suffer an immediate loss in value
in his lots. Martin, 150 Idaho at 513-14, 248 P.3d at 1248-49. The court distinguished the
developer's case from the hotel owner in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium
District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005). In Ameritel Inns, the court explained that the hotel
was a taxpayer whose funds were extracted by the taxing district; and that there would be an
imminent and certain increase in taxes. But the mere increase in supply and lost market value in
Martin was not enough. So too here. It is pure speculation how a tax credit to one company will
negatively impact another participant in that market. By our count, there are no fewer than
eleven tax credits for which businesses are eligible. Plaintiff already competes in a marketplace
where tax credits flow to some businesses, and maybe to it, but not to others. It is not certain
that this particular tax credit will cause Plaintiff any harm.
Plaintiff is more like the developer in Martin, the travel agents in American Society of
Travel Agents, the candidate in Fulani, the parents in Allen v. Wright, and the energy company in
DEK Energy. For starters, this is not a situation where Plaintiff and the competitor play under
different sets of rules. Plaintiff is fully eligible to do the things necessary to be eligible for the
tax credit, apply for it, and benefit from it. This is not a case where a competitor has been given
a clearer path that Plaintiff cannot seek to join. This is not a case where a regulatory body has
expanded the class of businesses that may participate in a given market.
7.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges increased competition only generally, and does not

allege any demonstrable loss of market share or profits or quantify any financial impacts or other
identifiable loss of competitive position in the marketplace. Do we know (a) what ERMC does?
(b) how Paylocity competes? (c) the companies' relative market share? (d) each company's
customer base? (e) whether ERMC has lost customers? or (f) how, specifically, it will lose
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customers?

Plaintiff has alleged none of these things.

It merely alleges a general unfair

economic advantage and lists some things it anticipates it will have to do to adapt to a
competitor. See U.S. Telecom Association, 295 F.3d at 1331 (affidavits showing specific, realworld harm directly attributable to actual lower prices hampering the telecoms' business
interests); Am. Soc. of Travel Agents, 566 F.2d at 148-49 (no showing of customers who left or
bought from the non-profit organization instead of plaintiffs). Plaintiffs allegations of harm are
nothing more than an "exercise in the conceivable"; it simply asserts "that [it] can imagine
circumstances in which [it] could be affected by the agency's action." United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973). Accordingly, Plaintiffs

alleged injury-in-fact fails the concreteness, imminence, and causal-connection test.
8.

This brings the argument to the other problem with Plaintiffs harm. It's self-

inflicted. The injuries alleged relate to things Plaintiff expects it will do now in response to the
tax credit to the competitor. But the injury-in-fact requirement cannot be satisfied by selfinflicted harm. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005); PetroChem Processing, Inc. v. Envtl. Prof. Agency, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Clapper v.
Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. at 1152-53. Self-inflicted harm done in anticipatory response

to government conduct of which a plaintiff is not the object, breaks the causal chain necessary to
show standing.

Because Plaintiff has simply alleged a general "unfair advantage," its own

expected conduct based on that alleged unfair advantage deprives the government conduct of any
causal connection to Plaintiffs alleged harm. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, for example,
the plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred costs based on a fear of being surveilled by a
surveill~ce statute they challenged.

But they lacked standing to challenge the statutory

surveillance program because absent a "threat of certainly impending interception under § 1881 a
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[the surveillance statute at issue], the costs that they have incurred to avoid surveillance are
simply the product of their fear of surveillance," and that fear was "insufficient to create
standing." 133 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing Larid v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972)). Under the rationale in
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the steps Plaintiff itself says it has taken or anticipates it will
)

have to take are insufficient to establish standing.

*

*

*

Anytime the government modifies the tax code or any one of myriad laws relating to
commerce generally, that action has an impact on the marketplace and, to some degree, market
participants. Participants react to those changes; changes in behavior carry risk and cost, risk
and cost may produce benefit and the potential for innovation. But not every decision a business
makes in response to a modification of the tax code or laws relating to commerce causes injury.
Plaintiffs argument means that any time government acts this way, a party can manufacture
standing through its own conduct in response to what it thinks someone else may do. There are
too many contingencies in this theory to support standing. This reduces standing below the
minimum threshold the Idaho Supreme Court has established, and it should be rejected.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, and enter
judgment in Defendant's favor.
DATED this 15th day of July, 2016.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE A
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
801 E. State Street, Suite 50
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

[ZI U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
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Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RIC NELSON
DEPUTY

Attorney for PlaintiffEmployers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of ihe IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 1605467
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF

COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURCE OF AMERICA, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation, by and through its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cause of action
against Defendant, alleges as follows:
1.

This action arises under the provisions of Article II, § 1, Article III, § 1, and Article

VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides:

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
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2. Article 3, §1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives."
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from
time to time as shall seem necessary and just..."
4.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be

exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, l 03
Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982)
5.

In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act,

("IRIA") which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the
Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To· qualify for the tax
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC")
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by the Governor. The EAC is
established under Idaho Code §67-4704.
6.

This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce,

by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested
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solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers.
7.

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the

Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch of Idaho State Government,
and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void.
8.

Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation,

("Employers Resource") is one ofldaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28%
credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000.
9. .

The State of Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an

unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure Plaintiffs'
employees away from Employers' Resource.
10.

In June, 2016, following approval of its IRIA tax subsidy application, Paylocity

contracted with the Idaho Department of Labor to receive an additional $1.2 million of Idaho
Workforce Development Training Funds to train its Idaho employees. The Idaho Department of
Labor announced issuance of the contract in a Press Release issued on July 5, 2016. A true and
accurate copy of that Press Release is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and incorporated herein
by reference.
11.

Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result

of the actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the
following:
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a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation of the web requirements to
effectivelyy compete against Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred additional
expenses for internet competitive software;
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the number of
employees it hires, Employers Resource expects that its key employees will be targeted by
Paylocity because of their training, experience, and familiarity with Employers' existing Idaho
customer base. Employers' will incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to retain its
key employees;
c) Employers' anticipates the need to protect its existing Idaho business since
Paylocity can afford to undercut Employers' pricing, in part due to its favorable tax treatment.
Employers will incur expenses in advertising and marketing expenses to retain its clients;
12.

The discretionary administration of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Program as

applied to Employers' Resource's business damages Employers Resource and other Idaho
businesses in the following ways:
a) By rewarding the cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants
into the Idaho business market;
b) By distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by
chosen companies to the detriment of existing Idaho businesses, including Employers.
c) By incentivizing Employers Resource and other existing Idaho businesses to
relocate their principal offices to other states offering similar tax incentives to out of state
businesses;
d) By penalizing Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets;
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e) By pitting Counties and Municipalities against each other to compete for new
business by offering discretionary and arbitrary tax breaks.
13.

Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce

and is named in that official capacity.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Declaratory Relief)
14.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-

13, as though set forth herein in full.
15.

The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary

authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbfds a delegation of unrestricted and
unguided taxing power.
16.

The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of

Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, §1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government.
17.

In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets

out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of
Idaho. That statute provides:
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number
of new jobs in the state ofldaho. In order to be considered for participation, an
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director
and shall include:
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that
will accrue to the ·state as a result of the project;
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council;
(c) Proof of a community match;

First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief

5

000067

(d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission;
(e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term;
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state;
(g) An anticipated project inception date ~d proposed schedule of progress;
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to
issuance of the tax credit;
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment;
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of
such jobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs;
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by
the project;
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63,
Idaho Code; and
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement.
(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter
into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the
council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application."
18.

The only requirement that the legislature included in Idaho Code §67-4739 for a

business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to
the Director of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order to claim the
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than twenty (20) such jobs over
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the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs
over the term of the project if created within an urban community."
19.

Idaho Code §67-4739(l)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as

part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even
subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government.
20.

Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete

discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an
entity will create the required number of'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings,
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information
submitted.
21.

The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the

EAC with regard to the grant or denial of tax credits. The Director's sole duty is to determine
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited.
22.

Although provision has been made for judicial review of a rejected application by

the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case," and
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to
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the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial
remedy to an aggrieved applicant.
23.

The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority to grant a tax credit

to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines,
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business
entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism.
24.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and

through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and
capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating
Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution.
25.

Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and taxpayers have and will

suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the EAC,
continues to exercise its unlimited discretion to grant tax relief to some business entities and
deny that relief to other entities, on an arbitrary and capricious basis, in violation of the Idaho
Constitution's grant of all taxing authority to the state Legislature.
26.

Plaintiff is entitled to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that the Idaho

Department of Commerce and the Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not
have authority under the Idaho Constitution to administer the provisions of Idaho Code §67-
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4739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by
the Department under the provisions of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho
Department of Commerce and the EAC under this statute are null and void.
27.

Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate

the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and
taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred
herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce,

by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and
void.
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. ·
Dated: July 21, 2016

By

oti?T~
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of July, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing First Amended Complaint was served as follows:
Steven L. Olsen
Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100

[ ]
[x]
[ ]
[ ]

First Class Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 336-9712
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
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Idaho Department of Labor
News > News Releases

Date: 7/5/2016
Information Contact 1: Georgia Smith: (208) 332-3570 X 2102:
Information Contact 2: Carmela Ramirez: 208-332-3570 ext. 3964:

Paylocity Receives $1.2 Million to Train New Employees
Paylocity Corporation (NASDAQ: PCTY) has contracted with the Idaho Department of Labor to use $1.2 million in Idaho
Workforce Development Training Funds to equip its new employees with the skills necessary to operate its new Idaho
facility.
The positions will pay an average hourly wage of $21 plus employer-assisted medical benefits.
Paylodty is a cloud-based payroll and human capital management software services company for mid-sized
organizations. The publicly traded company was named one of the 500 fastest-growing technology companies in 2013,
2014 and 2015 by Deloitte Touche Tohmalsu Limited.
The Boise-based jobs will include client service, implementation, technical services, software development and other
related _tun~ons. The company has created 50+ new jobs in the Treasure Valley since opening up its doors in January of
this year. Paylocity anticipates creating up to 500 new positions in Idaho.
Idaho's Workforce Development Training Fund, established in 1996, is used to reimburse businesses for the cost of
training new workers or retraining existing workers who would otherwise be laid off. Eligible businesses must produce a
product or service sold outside their region, and the jobs must pay at least $12 an hour and include employer-assisted
health Insurance. The fund is financed by a 3 percent set-aside of the unemployment insurance taxes paid by businesses
each year.
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Case No. CV OC 1605467

)

)
)

Plaintiff,

}

vs.

DEFENDANT'S RENEWED
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) . Oral .Argument Requested
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
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Defendant, Idaho Department of Commerce Director Megan Ron1c, renews her Motion to
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Dismiss for the reasons set forth in her Memorandum in Support':of Defendant'J Motion to

.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,

Case No. CV-OC-2016-0005467

Plaintiff,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the Idaho Department of Commerce,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF STANDING

Defendant.

This case concerns the constitutionality of the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act, which
provides for refundable tax credits to businesses that create a minimum number of new, fulltime, non-seasonal jobs that pay an average wage equal to or exceeding wages in the relative
county.

Employers Resource Management Company (ERMC) filed this action on March 23,

2016 against Megan Ronk as Director of Idaho Department of Commerce (Ronk), seeking
declaratory relief.
BACKGROUND

ERMC offers human resources solutions that include human resources management, personnel
file maintenance, personnel form management, vacation tracking and reporting, sick leave
I

tracking and reporting, new hire reporting, unemployment claim management, FLSA regulation

.
I

expertise, DOL compliance expertise, regulation monitoring, employee handbooks, performance
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review materials, and online training. It also provides payroll services; HR and tax compliance;
workers compensation and safety programs; safety management; benefits solutions; employee
savings club, such as Christmas savings club and vacation savings club; retirement plans; and
JumpStart programs.

The Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act is a statutory scheme to incentivize companies to bring
employment to Idaho. The statute provides refund tax credits to both existing Idaho businesses
and new Idaho businesses. A business may apply to receive a refundable tax credit for up to 15
~

years.

Once an applicant has applied, the Commerce director does an in-depth economic

analysis of the project and the application material and either submits the application and a
recommended term and percentage of refund to the Economic Advisory Council or she may
determine that the business has not met eligibility requirements.

The Council may approve or reject her recommendation and/or may request additional
information. If the application is approved, the business and Commerce Department enter into
an agreement (specifying the terms of the credit, duration of the credit, for casted amount of new
tax revenue the project will generate, and percentage of tax revenues that will be reimbursed).
Each year, a business will be evaluated and must demonstrate that it is in compliance with its
agreement with the Commerce Department and other requirements. The Commerce Department
then determines if the credit should be provided. ERMC does not allege it applied for the tax
credit refund. ERMC alleges another company, Paylocity, applied and was approved for a tax
credit of 28%, or possibly $6.5 million. 1

1

Comp!. For Deel. J. ,r 8.
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Ronk filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 4, 2016, asserting ERMC lacks standing to challenge the
constitutionality of this statute. ERMC filed a Response brief on May 20, 2016. ERMC filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Declaration of Christ Troupis on, May 26,
2016. Ronk filed a Reply brief on July 15, 2016, further asserting ERMC does not have standing
because it cannot show injury in fact.

A hearing was held on July 20, 2016 in which the Court granted ERMC's Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint.

On July 26, 2016, ERMC filed an Amended Complaint for

Declaratory Relief. Ronk then renewed the Motion to Dismiss. The hearing was held on August
2, 2016 and the matter then taken under advisement.
LEGAL STANDARD

"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only
when it appears beyond doubt that the ERMC can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
which would entitle the ERMC to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536, 835 P.2d 1346,
1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the ERMC will
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to dismiss must

be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record are viewed in
favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243 P.3d 642,
648-49 (2010).

To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing - 3
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to relief above the speculative level." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which
the ERMC includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there 1s some
insurmountable bar to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347.

ANALYSIS

Fundamentally, Courts avoid wading into political issues which are better left for the other two
branches of the government which are better equipped to address.

Mechanisms have been

established to make sure that Courts stay within their roles to decide actual live controversies
between parties. Ripeness, Mootness, and Standing are three of these mechanisms.

ERMC alleges the refund credit has given Palocity an unfair economic advantage over ERMC
and the "ability to lure away employee's from ERMC."2 ERMC further alleges that "Idaho
taxpayers have and will suffer harm if Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through EAC,
continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny relief to others ...." 3 Ultimately,
ERMC contends it has "competitor standing."

2

3

Amended Comp. for Deel. J. ,r 9.
Compl. For Deel. Relief,r 22.
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ERMC's alleged injuries are (1) it had to buy "competitive software" to effectively compete
against Paylocity; 4 (2) it will have to increase salaries and benefits to prevent losing valuable
employees to Paylocity;' 5 and (3) it will need to spend more money on advertising and marketing
to retain its clients, because Paylocity will receive a tax refund and can undercut ERMC's
pricing. 6 ERMC further alleges that it and other businesses are damaged by (4) "rewarding
cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants into the Idaho business market;"7
(5) "distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by chosen
companies to the detriment of existing Idaho businesses"; 8 (6) "incentivizing relocation of
principle officers to other states that provide similar tax incentives"; 9 (7) "penalizing Idaho
companies with established business in "niche" markets"; 10 and (8) "pitting Counties and
Municipalities against each other to compete for new businesses." 11

Ronk asserts that ERMC (1) does not have a legally protected interest in its competitive position
in the market; (2) the alleged harm is speculative and not imminent; (3) the alleged harm is selfinflicted and too attenuated and contingent to meet the standing requirement. 12 Further, Ronk
asserts that ERMC alleges only a general increase in competition, but does not allege any
specific or demonstrable loss of market shares, profits, any concrete financial impact, or any
other identifiable loss of competitive position in the marketplace.

4
5
6

7

Amended Comp. for Deel. J. ,r 1 l(a).
Id. at,r }}(b).
I
Id. at ,r ll(c).
Id.at ,r 12(a).

Id. at ,r 12(b).
Id. at ,r 12(c).
IO Jd. at ,r }2(d).
11
Id. ,r 12(3).
12
Reply Mem. In Sup. OfDef.'s Mot. To Dismiss, p.2.

8

9
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It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's

jurisdiction must have standing. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121,
124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this
Court before reaching the merits of the case. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778
P.2d 757, 759 (1989). The doctrine of standing is a subcategory of justiciability. Id at 639, 778
P.2d at 761. The doctrine is imprecise and difficult to apply. Id at 641, 778 P.2d at 763.
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have
adjudicated. Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).

To establish standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Young, at 104-05, 44
P.3d at 1159-60. This requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Id But even if a showing
can be made of an injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted harm is a generalized
grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. Id

First, in order to have standing, one must have a protectable legal interest. An injury in fact must
be an injury which the plaintiff has a legally protect interest in. ERMC relies on the theory of
competitor standing, but fails to address the issue that in order to demonstrate injury in fact, the
injury must be to an actual legally protectable interest. ERMC's argument assumes that ERMC
has a legally protectable position in the marketplace, which it does not.
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Where there is a direct impediment to a company, then a company may be potentially harmed in
a way that is sufficient to show a protectable legal interest. In contrast, when the conduct is
directed at a third party, with no direct impact to the plaintiff that is traceable to the government
conduct, then there is no protectable interest at stake. This is the situation in this case. The
government conduct is directed at a third party, Palocity and other businesses who qualify for the
tax credit, and not ERMC. The conduct has no direct impact on the ERMC that is traceable to
the government conduct. Accordingly, EMRC has no protectable interest at stake in this matter.

Additionally, ERMC alleges that the tax refund would injure its competitive position in the
market. ERMC alleged that a tax credit has incentivized a competitor to set up its business in
Idaho and ERMC will have to do certain things to compete against this competitor. It must be
noted that ERMC is not the object of the government action. Instead, Paylocity, a third party, is
the object of the government action.

This fails to satisfy the requirement that there is a

"substantial likelihood that the relief requested will prevent the claimed injury." ERMC has only
alleged a mere possibility that competition will increase 13 and that there is a possibility that the
increased competition will injure ERMC. ERMC purported injuries are abstract and speculative
and cannot be said to be specific or distinct and palpable.

The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement of
"personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct palpable injury" to the
13

Which is the actual purpose of this legislation.
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plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 778 P.2d 757,763 (1989).

The rule which ERMC relies on to assert standing is competitor standing to establish that it has a
personal. stake, or distinct palpable injury. The general rule is that a competitor has standing to
challenge future loss of profits. National Tank Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 550 F.Supp. 113, 117
(D.C. Dist. Ct. 1982). However, Idaho has not recognized competitor standing. Martin v.

Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,514,248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011). Further, even when competitor
standing has been recognized, "it is only when a successful challenge will set up an absolute bar
to competition, not merely an additional hurdle, that competitor standing exists."

Id

A

successful challenge of the Reimbursement Act will not close the market to Paylocity or other
competitors within ERMC's market; instead, it will only add an additional hurdle.

Finally, ERMC fails to establish the causal link between the government action and the harm
alleged, even if it were unique and particularized. When the person is not the object of the
government conduct, causation hinges on the responses of someone else and that response is not
necessarily predictable or controllable, which makes any link between the harm and the
government conduct extremely difficult to grasp.

Governmental conduct that benefits a third

party which then indirectly affects the plaintiff is distinguishable from government conduct that
directly affects the plaintiff.

Ultimately, ERMC alleges the government action creates an unfair economic advantage to a
competitor.

While this may be true in general, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the
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government conduct, and not other market factors, is the specific cause of any actual harm to any
legally protected interest that ERMC may enjoy. There is no clear link between the impact of the
law and any harm claimed to ERMC, the alleged damages are speculative at best, it would be
impossible to demonstrate that a judgment in ERMC's favor would redress the claimed
injuries. 14

Lastly, at the hearing on August 2, 2016, Ronk's counsel requested the Court strike Paragraph 10
of the First Amended Complaint and the accompanying attachment. ERMC's First Amended
Complaint, as filed, was different than the proposed amended complaint attached to the
Declaration filed in support of the Motion for Leave to file the Amended Complaint. Paragraph
10 and the accompanying attachment were not contained in the original proposed amended
complaint. Accordingly, Paragraph 10 and the attachment are deemed stricken, pursuant to
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f), and were not considered. Nevertheless and in any event,
the information contained therein would not have impacted the outcome of this decision.
CONCLUSION

ERMC challenges the legislature's exercise of its constitutional authority. But ERMC has no
standing to challenge the Reimbursement Act because the program makes tax credits available to
businesses that meet certain criteria. The program does not actually do anything to ERMC,
therefore, ERMC has suffered no particularized injury by which to establish standing in a
challenge to the act. Instead, ERMC attempts to manufacture standing by alleging it may have to
do certain things or that it expects certain things will occur as a response to another company
14

Even ifERMC did have standing, however, and contrary to ERMC's assertion, this is a politician issue that is well
within the authority of the legislature.
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receiving a tax credit under the program. In short, ERMC has no protectable, legal interest that
has been directly damaged by the Act; the claim of injury is ill-defined, fuzzy, and speculative,
essentially self-inflicted in mere anticipation and expectation of what may happen.

Based upon the above and foregoing, Ronk's Motion to Dismiss ERMC's Amended Complaint
for lack ~f standing is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1~ f August, 2016.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
the within instrument to:

Js"aay of August, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of

Mr. Carl Withroe, &q.
954 W. Jefferson St.
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Mr. Christ Troupis, Esq.
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
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AUG 15 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE HARDY
DEPl.lTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,

Case No. CV-OC-2016-0005467

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of
the Idaho Department of Commerce,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED this /).,~day of August, 2016.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Jl:--

1 hereby certify that on this / ;
within instrument to:

day of August, 2016, I mailed ( served) a true and correct copy of the

Mr. Carl Withroe, Esq.
954 W. Jefferson St.
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Mr. Christ Troupis, Esq.
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
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SEP 19 2016

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
PO Box2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 2081938-5584
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

CHRISTOPHER o, FIICH, OIG!rk
By SANTIAGO BAAAI08
DEPUTV

Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,

)
)

An Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

)

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

)
)
)
)

_____________
Defendant.

TO:

Case No.: CV QC 1605467
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Employers Resource Management
Company, hereby appeals against the above named Respondent to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above
entitled action on the 15th day of August, 2016, The Honorable Samuel
A. Hoaglund, District Judge Presiding.

Notice of Appeal
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.

.
2.

That the party has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and
the final judgment described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order
under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(1) I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant
intends to assert, provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are as
follows:
(a) That the District Court erred in Granting Defendant Megan Ronk's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing in finding that ERMC had no
protectible interest that was harmed by the government's conduct in
granting Paylocity a tax credit.
(b)

That the District Court erred in Granting Defendant Megan Ronk's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing in finding that ERMC did not
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct, and a substantial likelihood that the relief
requested would prevent or redress the claimed injury.

(b) Appellant may assert other issues in addition to the foregoing.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a) Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's transcript in both
hard copy and electronic format of the following proceedings:
(1) the July 20, 2016 hearing on Defendants' M~tion to Dismiss;
(2) the August 3, 2016 hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Notice of Appeal
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6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's
Record on Appeal in addition to those automatically included under Rule
28, I.A.R.

7.

(a) 5/4/2016

Motion to Dismiss Case

(b) 5/4/2016

Memorandum

(c) 5/20/2016

Memorandum

(d) 5/20/2016

Notice of Hearing

(e) 5/24/2016

Hearing Scheduled

(f) 5/26/2016

Motion

(g) 5/26/2016

Declaration

(h) 5/26/2016

Memorandum

(i) 7/15/2-16

Reply

G) 7/20/2016

Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages

(k) 7/20/2016

Hearing Scheduled

(I) 7/20/2016

Motion to Dismiss

(m)8/15/2016

Memorandum Order and Decision

(n) 8/15/2016

Judgment

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the District
Court Reporter, Christy Olesek.
(b) That the District Court reporter, Christy Olesek, has been paid $123.25
for preparation of the reporter's transcript;
(c) That the initial fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid;
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(d) That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid;
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2016.

By

{'A-0')~

Christ T. Troupis I
Attorney for Appellant
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-.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of September, 2016, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL BY EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
[x]
[]
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

Steven L. Olsen
Carl J. Withroe
Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100

By_{//4_;;;_--':::::;-)-~-"-/'---_ _
Christ T. Troupis
f
Attorney for Appellant
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1
2
3

To: Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
(208) 334-2616

4
5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No.

6

7
·8

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

44511

)
)
)
)

9

vs.

)
)

10
11
12

MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
)
Director of the IDAHO
)
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
)
Defendant.
)
-----__________ )

13
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 30 PAGES LODGED
14
15
16

Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada.
Honorable Samuel Hoagland, District Court Judge

17
18

One volume contains:
7-20-16:
Motion to Dismiss
8-2-16:
Motion to Dismiss

19

Date:

October 11, 2016

20
21
22

23
24

/I~
( l !}/4.d_, ?'f R..
_LJ
_______________________________________
_
Christine Anne Olesek, Official Court Reporter
Official Court Reporter,
Judge Samuel A. Hoagland
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. SRL-1044
Registered Professional Reporter

25
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL - 1044
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, an Idaho
Corporation,

Supreme Court Case No. 44511
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of
Commerce,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 25th day of October, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, an Idaho
Corporation,

Supreme Court Case No. 44511
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of
Commerce,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
CHRIST T. TROUPIS

CARL J. WITHROE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

EAGLE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

oc1 25 2.0\o

Date of Service: - - - - - - - -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EMPLOYERS RESOURCE
MANAGEMENTCOMPANY,anldaho
Corporation,

Supreme Court Case No. 44511
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of
Commerce,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
19th day of September, 2016.
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